Malicious DNS resolution redirecting to other IPs is a common and highly insidious problem in website operations in recent years. Attackers hijack DNS records, forge resolution results, control third-party resolution platforms, or exploit security vulnerabilities in authoritative DNS servers to force domain names that should point to the server to resolve to attacking IPs or phishing sites, causing abnormal access, misleading users, hijacking of business operations, and even data leaks. For enterprises, these attacks are covert, highly damaging, and if not handled promptly, can directly impact brand reputation and user security.

　　Malicious resolution is usually not caused by a single factor, but rather by a combination of security risks. When authoritative DNS servers are compromised, resolution platforms are compromised, domain registrars' accounts are leaked, account passwords are weak, or third-party DNS settings are flawed, attackers can easily modify the domain's resolution records to point to incorrect IPs, thereby hijacking the website. DNS poisoning and cache poisoning are also common methods, using forged responses to deliver incorrect resolution records to users, causing abnormal access or even redirecting users to malicious pages. Especially with some low-priced or unreliable DNS service providers, API security measures are weak, allowing attackers to directly add or tamper with resolution records through forged interface calls. Understanding these attack methods helps website owners quickly determine the source when "DNS resolution has been modified."

　　When a domain suddenly points to an unfamiliar IP, access is redirected, or DNS records are tampered with, an emergency response process needs to be initiated immediately to prevent the attack from escalating. The first step in the emergency is to quickly check the console of the authoritative DNS server to confirm whether there are any anomalies in A, CNAME, MX, TXT, and other DNS records. If tampering is found, the correct records should be restored immediately, and the DNS should be manually refreshed to accelerate global node synchronization. Next, check whether the domain registrar's account has been logged into from another location or illegally bound to an API. Check the account security logs and immediately change the account password, disable unauthorized API keys, and prevent further calls. If the DNS resolution behavior originates from an API attack by the DNS provider, the relevant API permissions should be frozen immediately.

　　If DNS cache pollution or DNS poisoning is suspected, multi-location DNS testing tools should be used to compare the resolution results to determine whether it is a hijacking of a specific ISP or a global anomaly. For malicious resolution caused by ISP hijacking, users can be advised to switch to a trusted public DNS server.

　　In addition, the `dig` tool can be used to check the actual DNS resolution. If the authoritative DNS returns the correct result, but the resolution differs in some regions, it indicates cache pollution, not that the administrator's DNS records have been tampered with. In this case, the TTL should be appropriately reduced and records actively refreshed to speed up normal resolution and overwrite the polluted results.

　　After completing the core tasks of emergency response, it is necessary to further investigate vulnerabilities at the system and platform levels to prevent attackers from using the same methods to maliciously tamper with records again. Enterprises often neglect the security configuration of domain name management permissions, allowing attackers to directly intrude through weak passwords, shared accounts, exposed API keys, or leaked email accounts. To completely prevent malicious resolution from recurring, strong account protection mechanisms are needed, including binding MFA, restricting API call sources, and disabling unnecessary DNS update interfaces.

　　For long-term security protection, using authoritative DNS services with secure anti-tampering and operation auditing functions is crucial. Mainstream DNS platforms support DNS locking, which can prevent DNS records from being modified. Enabling measures such as "DNS change verification code," "DNSSEC," "API access IP restriction," and "account login region restriction" can significantly reduce the risk of malicious resolution. In particular, DNSSEC verifies the source of DNS resolution results through digital signatures, preventing man-in-the-middle attacks and serving as a crucial means of preventing DNS poisoning. DNSSEC needs to be enabled on both the registrar's and DNS server's ends for complete protection.

　　When using third-party cloud services, enterprises also need to check for CNAME records pointing to external services. If a CNAME record still points to a released cloud resource after it has been deleted, it can be easily taken over by attackers (CNAME takeover). To avoid this risk, all DNS records should be scanned regularly, and invalid CNAME records should be deleted to prevent hijacking due to expired external platform resources.

　　The core of preventing malicious DNS resolution lies in establishing a long-term security system, including strengthening account security, using reliable DNS service providers, enabling end-to-end verification mechanisms, regularly checking infrequently used DNS records, and setting DNS locks. Most malicious DNS resolution incidents stem from avoidable human negligence, such as multiple people sharing DNS accounts, weak passwords, prolonged inactivity, and failure to enable two-factor authentication. Therefore, enterprises must incorporate domain name management into a unified security system, regularly audit account permissions, and prevent any idle permissions from being retained.

　　In addition, enterprises need to deploy continuous monitoring mechanisms. DNS monitoring systems can be used to detect resolution anomalies in real time, such as modifications to A records, replacement of MX records, or additions to TXT records, and promptly send notifications to administrators. When unauthorized changes occur to resolutions, the system can issue an alert immediately to prevent the attack from escalating. For important domains, third-party DNS resolution snapshots can be used to compare resolution changes in a timely manner, ensuring that any abnormal modifications are addressed immediately.

　　In summary, malicious modification of DNS resolutions is not only a technical risk but also a management risk. Only by establishing a robust protection system encompassing account security, platform security, DNS security mechanisms, and monitoring mechanisms can malicious resolution be eliminated at its source. Countermeasures and preventative measures all adhere to the four principles of "timely detection, rapid processing, continuous monitoring, and strict access control." Enterprises should regularly self-check DNS records, disable invalid resolutions, check historical API keys, and audit login logs to prevent attackers from exploiting loopholes for subsequent attacks. With systematic protection, even if attackers attempt to tamper with records, they will be intercepted immediately, significantly reducing the risk.